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from Epidemiological Bulletin, Vol. 24 No. 3, September 2003
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Table 1: Characteristics of the 2000 and 2001 outbreaks
in countries that notified confirmed cases of measles
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| Year, country |
Suspected cases already discarded
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No. of discarded cases/100.000
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Total of confirmed cases
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No. of sporadic cases
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No. of outbreaks
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No. of cases per outbreaks
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No. (%) of outbreaks linked to importations
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Genetic characteristics and source of outbreak virus
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| 2000 | ||||||||
| Argentina | 929 | 2.5 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | Unknown |
| Bolivia (a) | 1,391 | 16.7 | 122 | 3 | 66, 12, 11 | 0 | D6 (endemic) | |
| Brazil (a) | 54,357 | 31.5 | 36 | 22 | 1 | 15 | -- | D6 (?) (endemic) |
| Canada(b) | 6,000 | 19 | 199 | 0 | 4 | 2, 6, 30, 165 | 4 (100) | D6, D7 (Imported) |
| Colombia | 2.047 | 4.8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | -- | -- | -- |
| Dominican Republic (a) | 3,397 | 40 | 254 | 0 | 1 | 254 | 0 | D6 (endemic) |
| Haiti (a)(c) | 187 | 2.3 | 990 | 0 | 1 | 990 | 0 | D6 (endemic) |
| Mexico | 2,231 | 22.2 | 30 | 7 | 8 | 2-5 | ? | Imported (?) |
| Peru | 5,680 | 21.8 | 1 | 1 | 0 | -- | -- | -- |
| United States | 1,386 | 0.46 | 86 | 11 | 10 | 3-9 | 5 (50) | Imported (D6, D4, G2, D3) |
| Venezuela | 1,562 | 6.3 | 22 | 0 | 1 | 22 | unknown | unknown |
| 2001 | ||||||||
| Brazil | 38,679 | 18.2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | -- | 1 (100) | D4 (to be confirmed) |
| Canada | N/A | N/A | 33 | 11 | 6 | 7, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3 | 6 (100) | H1, D3, D5 (Imported) |
| Colombia | 1,514 | 3.5 | 1 | 1 | 0 | -- | -- | -- |
| Ecuador | 1,575 | 12.3 | 2 | 2 | 0 | -- | -- | unknown |
| El Salvador | 372 | 5.9 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 (100) | D7 (imported) |
| Mexico | 717 | 0.7 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 (100) | unknown (imported?) |
| Dominican Republic | 1,056 | 12.4 | 113 | 0 | 1 | 1.132 | -- | D6 (endemic) |
| Haiti(a) | 65 | 0.8 | 159 | 0 | 1 | 159 | 0 | D6 (endemic) |
| United States (d) | N/A | N/A | 109 | N/A | 10 | 3-14 | 9 (90) | Imported (D7, D5, D3, H1) |
| Venezuela (a) (e) | 1,544 | 6.2 | 113 | 9 | 1 | 104 | 1 (100) | D9 (imported) |
| NOTE: N/A = not applicable (a) Countries with reported endemic transmission in 2000 (b) No. of discarded cases is an approximate minimum based on the no. of measles IgM-negative cases reported each year. (c) The first cases may have been imported. Dominican Republic had measles circulation after 1999 and shares a large border with Haiti. (d) Preliminary data. (e) The first case of the outbreak was reportedly a traveler from Europe. |
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Monitoring vaccine coverage
Official country reports are the main source of information on vaccination coverage.
However, the population denominators used are often extrapolated from census
data that are more than 10 years old, and population growth and rural-urban
migration patterns have substantially changed since then, making census information
often unsuitable for providing appropriate denominators for local vaccine program
managers to determine vaccination coverage. The problem is often evident even
with aggregated provincial or national data. As a consequence, there are often
no reliable coverage standards to make program managers accountable for their
vaccination efforts and reward a job well done. Although performing regular
coverage surveys that are valid at the local level could provide precise estimates
of coverage, their regular use would be prohibitively expensive and would drain
human resources not easily available in most countries.
Methodology for house-to-house monitoring
The 95% coverage level required to maintain the interruption of indigenous
measles transmission means, in practical terms, that all (or almost all) children
must be vaccinated. An overseer could rapidly assess the completeness of the
vaccination effort at the local level by visiting a limited number of houses
with 1- to 4-year-old children and asking for evidence of their prior vaccination
with a measles-containing vaccine. To decrease the likelihood of missing problem
areas (thus wrongly concluding that the neighborhood is well vaccinated when
it is not), the overseer is encouraged to select a total of four blocks far
away from the health center in zones that are difficult to access or underserved,
have a high proportion of recent migrants of rural origin, or where recent cases
have been reported. It is important that a member of the local staff directly
involved in vaccination accompanies and assists the overseer in this task, thus
becoming a direct witness to the monitoring process. This person should not
participate in the choice of blocks or houses to be visited.
Starting in a corner of the block chosen, the team moves from
one door to the next nearest one until five houses with 1- to 4-year-old children
for whom immunization information is available are visited. The same procedure
should be followed for the remaining three blocks. A child is considered vaccinated
if the vaccination is recorded on the vaccination card. In some countries (e.g.,
Haiti), where vaccination cards are not always updated during door-to-door vaccination,
verbal confirmation of vaccination by the parents or caretakers is also accepted
during campaigns. If unvaccinated children are found, the monitors should ask
parents to explain why the children are not vaccinated. If the adult responsible
for providing the card is absent or if it is convincingly shown that the vaccination
card is kept elsewhere (e.g., the child does not live there), the household
is excluded from the sample and not registered on the chart.
The monitoring ends when a total of 20 houses with eligible children
have been visited. Because it would be very unlikely to find many houses with
eligible unvaccinated children in a well-vaccinated neighborhood, the finding
of a total of two houses with at least 1 nonimmunized child each (even before
20 houses are visited) is reason enough to stop monitoring immediately and consider
that vaccination efforts in that neighborhood were ineffective.
The finding of unvaccinated children plus the information gathered
from parents will be the basis for providing feedback to the local vaccination
authorities as to the necessity and methods to improve immunization in the area.
For this feedback to strengthen the vaccination program at the local level,
house-to-house monitoring should be done regularly during all supervisory visits
and should be followed by specific recommendations.
Supervision during campaigns
In addition to routine vaccination, countries rely on periodic national
vaccination campaigns (i.e., follow-up campaigns) and mop-up operations to achieve
the interruption of indigenous measles transmission. These campaigns can be
affected by a number of problems, including the lack of proper day-to-day supervision
and inappropriate definition of territories to be vaccinated.
During door-to-door campaigns, the supervisors should verify daily
that the vaccination teams visited all houses in the selected sector by checking
that the doors of all houses were correctly marked by them. During both door-to-door
and fixed-post campaigns, house-to-house monitoring should be performed by a
selected team of overseers once vaccination in a neighborhood or health sector
is considered done by the program managers. Its findings, including the proportion
of children unvaccinated and reasons for a lack of vaccination, will be the
main tools used to define if the work in that neighborhood was indeed finalized
or needs to be redone. Monitoring results are more reliable if the monitors
are not the same people who were responsible for vaccination in that neighborhood
or health sector. Some countries (e.g., Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Paraguay, and Venezuela) have used overseers from the national and provincial
level. Bolivia and Ecuador have successfully used the program managers responsible
for vaccination in one health sector as monitors for another.
Adjustment and validation of population denominators
Ad hoc adjustments of coverage data by selecting alternative denominators
appropriate for the area may also be used. In areas with high rates of institutional
births, the denominator population aged <1 year could be replaced
by the number of bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG) doses administered to
infants (coverage for the year = no. of doses of a measles-containing vaccine
administered to 1-year-old children divided by the number of BCG doses administered
to infants during the same year).
In areas with low rates of institutional births but high coverage
with the first dose of diphtheria-tetanus toxoids-pertussis (DTP) vaccine, a
better replacement for the denominator might be the number of first doses of
DTP administered to infants.
Use of birth registries
In some countries (e.g., Guatemala), in order to get birth registration
the parents must show the vaccination card with the first doses already registered,
and health centers use the yearly number of births to validate their population
denominator. In that way they establish the target population and set parameters
(Tabla de Salvación) for the monthly vaccination of 8.4% of the population
that is under 1 year of age. Coverage is measured monthly at this level. In
addition, coverage data are centralized and analyzed at the provincial level
to determine monthly which areas are at risk for low coverage and which ones
among them will need mop-up operations. This method could help to both improve
vaccination coverage and validate census information. Nonetheless, not all births
are registered and some are registered with important delays, and misclassification
of children who migrate within the first year of life also occurs.
Universal birth and vaccination registry
The reference standard for validating routine coverage is a universal registry
that includes the whole birth cohort. Such a system has been used in Uruguay
since the 1980s. In brief, all newborns are registered in a national database
that is also used for immunizations. This is updated electronically every time
the child receives a new vaccination. Although very accurate, data entry for
this system is still highly centralized; thus, data are not immediately available
at the local level for the day-to-day monitoring of undervaccinated children.
A project is ongoing to decentralize the system.
Zonification (Canalizaciones)
Another useful method is to divide the municipality by neighborhoods or
groups of blocks and place each one under the responsibility of a nurse or a
primary health care worker (health agent). This worker must visit all houses
in the neighborhood a number of times per year (usually up to 3) to provide
vaccinations and other preventive services. When well implemented and supervised,
this strategy can help underserved areas reach universal coverage for vaccination,
prenatal care, and other services. Variations of this strategy have been used
in Cuba, in some areas of Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, and other countries. Nonetheless,
it is labor-intensive and needs close supervision.
Drop-out rates
In areas with a stable, low-migration population, where vaccination coverage
does not vary substantially between years, the DTP1-measles drop-out rate (i.e.,
[no. of first doses of DTP administered to children <1 year of age - no.
of first doses of measles vaccine given to 1-year-old children/no. of first
doses of DTP administered to children <1 year of age]) could also provide
useful insights as to the proportion of children lost by the system. In countries
where health centers keep reliable records, a review of vaccination records
at the center can provide very valuable information on drop-out rates.
Outbreak investigation and surveillance
Quality of outbreak investigations
Because measles can be transmitted through aerosolized particles, an infectious
individual can transmit the virus to persons near and far away.(4) Also, the
virus can remain in the air and remain infectious after the infectious person
has left the room, thus allowing transmission even to people with whom this
person has had no direct contact (e.g., transmission in hospital waiting rooms,
public places, and on public transport systems). Therefore, the thorough investigation
of all contacts and places visited by the patient during the 718 days before
rash onset is essential in order to identify who could have transmitted the
disease to a new patient and where and when transmission could have occurred
(5). Also, the investigation of all contacts and places visited by the patient
during the period between the first respiratory symptoms until 4 days after
rash onset becomes fundamental in determining the existence of secondary transmission.
Moreover, because 718 days will elapse between contact with an infectious person
and rash onset in the secondary case, repeated visits to persons who may have
been exposed and repeated active-case searches are required for the investigation
of a measles case to be considered complete.
Serum samples should be obtained from the first 510 suspected
cases of each outbreak during the first visit to a health provider to detect
measles IgM. To be useful, these samples should be obtained within 30 days after
rash onset. Also, nasopharyngeal, oropharyngeal, or urine specimens should be
obtained within 7 days after rash onset to identify the responsible virus. Obtaining
viral specimens from all outbreaks is crucial to assess the interruption of
indigenous transmission. The virus genotype can identify a foreign virus or
the continuing circulation of an indigenous strain. In the absence of indigenous
transmission, all outbreaks should be import-related. Therefore, a timely and
adequate investigation of all outbreaks in countries without indigenous transmission
(including taking specimens for virus isolation) should establish the link to
an imported case in most outbreaks investigated (table 1).
Regarding outbreak size, the experience from Chile, Uruguay, Bolivia,
Brazil, and other countries during the last 3 years showed that outbreaks reaching
at least 25 cases often reveal important risk factors for disease transmission
that, if not appropriately controlled, could allow indigenous transmission to
resume. Also, local vaccination coverage data, adjusted as appropriate, should
be obtained and door-to-door monitoring of vaccination should be done in the
neighborhood of residency and in all municipalities visited by the case-patient
during the exposure and infectious periods. The information thus obtained should
be summarized in an outbreak investigation report form (the form can be found
on the Web at http://www.paho.org); this should allow the epidemiologist to
determine the outbreak duration and size, its link to importations, the age
groups most affected, the proportion of vaccinated cases by age, and the vaccination
status in the area. This information is vital to assess whether indigenous transmission
exists and to guide public health authorities as to the most appropriate control
measures, including the decision to conduct mop-up operations, how extensive
they should be, and which age and risk groups should be vaccinated.
Surveillance indicators
Because of the clinical similarities between measles and rubella, because
most countries in the Region already use measles- and rubella-containing vaccines
(mostly measles-mumps-rubella vaccine) in their routine program, and because
the control of rubella and congenital rubella are priorities for the Region,
PAHO recommends the integration of measles and rubella surveillance.
No surveillance system can detect all cases. Moreover, imported
cases are often overlooked: Visitors do not always seek medical care locally,
and those who do often go to private practitioners, who are less likely to report
cases. Therefore, a very sensitive system is needed to detect cases in countries
where indigenous transmission is low or absent. Such a system requires that
the quality of surveillance be regularly monitored and validated.
Even in the absence of suspected or confirmed measles or rubella
cases, all health centers in PAHOs sentinel surveillance system should
report weekly. The weekly reporting rate, calculated as the proportion of the
reporting health centers that sent their surveillance report in time, even in
the absence of cases, was successfully used to eradicate poliomyelitis and is
an effective tool for assessing surveillance compliance at the local level.
The quality of the data reported should also be monitored weekly. This includes
the percent of investigations that included a visit to the patients home
made within 48 hours of notification of a suspected case, the percent of suspected
cases with a blood sample obtained within 30 days after rash onset, the percent
of samples received by the reference laboratory within 5 days after being obtained,
the percent of laboratory results reported within 4 days after receipt of the
sample, and the percent of cases discarded on the basis of a laboratory test.
PAHO recommends 80% compliance with all indicators. They are monitored weekly
through the publication of a weekly measles bulletin that provides information
from all countries of the Region. Although an expected baseline for the incidence
of acute flaccid paralysis in the absence of poliomyelitis is widely utilized,
no such baseline is available for suspected cases of measles or rubella. In
the Region, such rates can vary between <1 and 40 per 100,000 (table 1).
Nonetheless, the proportion of discarded cases per 100,000 population reported
to the PAHO integrated measles-rubella surveillance system is useful for comparing
the surveillance sensitivity between municipalities with similar demographic
and geographic characteristics. It also permits the assessment of sensitivity
of the surveillance system over time in the same geographic area.
Active case searches
The main surveillance validation tool used by PAHO is active-case search.
Active-case searches should be performed regularly in silent (those not reporting
weekly) and underserved areas and in areas where cases have been identified,
areas with high rural-to-urban migration, or areas often visited by tourists.
Case searches should be implemented in health centers, hospitals, and private
clinics and at the workplace, schools, preschools, and other educational institutions.
The case search is usually limited to cases that occurred within the 30 days
preceding the investigation because viable serum samples can still be obtained
from the patients to confirm the diagnosis.
Case searches at health care institutions
The investigators visit health centers, hospitals, and private clinics and
practices and interview all health care personnel and statisticians, asking
them for suspected cases of measles or rubella or cases of rash and fever seen
within the previous month. Because most practitioners have never seen a measles
case in their practice, it is recommended to show them a picture of a case and
remind them of its main clinical characteristics. After the interviews, the
investigators check the outpatient, emergency room, and hospitalization records,
looking for unreported rash and fever cases. If a suspected case is found, the
investigators should record all information available, visit the patients
home, and perform a full case investigation, including obtaining a serum, nasopharyngeal,
or urine specimen as appropriate. At the end of the visit, the investigators
should discuss the problems detected with the staff, provide them with up-to-date
information on how to report suspected cases, encourage them to report, and
provide them with report forms. Pictures of measles cases, descriptions of the
main characteristics of the disease and the phone number to call if cases are
found, should also be hung in readily visible places.
Case Searches at Schools
These active-case searches serve a dual public health and education purpose.
The visitors, usually epidemiologists and other local public health personnel,
explain class-by-class the main characteristics of measles, using either a picture
of a measles case or by making a blackboard drawing of a child sick with measles.
They then briefly discuss the role of vaccination in measles prevention and
ask the students if they know of recent cases either at school or in their neighborhood.
Each class visit usually takes 10 minutes. If the students report a case compatible
with measles, the investigators should visit the house of the person suspected
of having measles, perform the investigation, and obtain a serum sample. In
well-conducted searches, the investigators might find as many as 1 suspected
case per school.
Comments and recommendations
The interruption of indigenous measles transmission in the Region of the
Americas in the absence of global eradication is challenging. Without a perfect
vaccine that protects 100% of those vaccinated, wild measles infections will
continue to occur due to importations from countries where the disease is endemic,
even if coverage is ³ 95%. In such cases, all outbreaks should be related
to importations (i.e., the index case should be imported), and disease transmission
originating from these importations should quickly die out. Therefore, the absence
of indigenous transmission means that, without intervention, the outbreaks will
be self-limited, and the average number of secondary cases (R) produced by a
typical imported case in a given population should be <1.(6)
Poor-quality coverage information due to inaccurate denominator
data is an important problem, particularly in rural areas that lose population
due to migrations not forecast by the census and in the highly populated urban
settings that attract migrants. Therefore, a systematic bias often occurs that
underestimates coverage in underserved rural areas and overestimates it in heavily
populated cities. Moreover, even if data at the provincial or municipal level
were reliable, these aggregated data often hide important inequalities at the
local level, where the most disadvantaged people (who would benefit more from
vaccination) usually have the lowest real coverage.(7) As shown by others, rigorous
monitoring is the key to the success of disease-control initiatives.(8) The
supervisors use of routine house-to-house monitoring to assess if the
eligible children have been vaccinated is time- and cost-efficient (it usually
takes less than 2 hours of the supervisors time). The adjustment and validation
of population denominators through selecting alternative denominators (DTP1
or BCG coverage), using universal registries, corrected birth registries, or
drop-out rates, can be useful depending on local characteristics. The decision
to use any combination of these tools to independently verify the vaccination
status of the community and assure accountability of the local vaccine program
managers relies on the supervisors experience. Nonetheless, assessing
coverage will not, by itself, resolve the problem. Local vaccine program managers
should be given the authority and resources needed to efficiently perform their
work; otherwise, supervision becomes a futile exercise.
In the absence of a 100% specific confirmatory test, some suspected
measles cases will be laboratory-confirmed even in countries without real measles
transmission and no imported cases. These confirmed cases will be
either false-positives (because of errors inherent to a less than 100% specific
confirmatory test) or true IgM positives due to a recent measles vaccination
in a person that otherwise has no wild measles infection. Because these sporadic
confirmed cases will continue to occur, PAHO emphasizes the importance of a
thorough case investigation, including visiting households, obtaining samples
and specimens for laboratory analysis, and performing coverage monitoring and
active-case searches.
To reach, maintain, and assess the interruption of indigenous
measles transmission, countries in the Region of the Americas should follow
all PAHO recommendations. These include (1) following the recommended vaccination
strategies, reaching 95% coverage by municipality; (2) monitoring coverage house-to-house
at the local level during supervisions, vaccination campaigns, and mop-up operations,
and implementing corrective measures immediately if insufficient coverage is
found; (3) investigating all cases and outbreaks within 48 hours of reporting,
following the guidelines described above; (4) performing routine measles surveillance
and validating compliance on a weekly basis using PAHO indicators; and (5) performing
regular active-case searches for surveillance validation.
Full compliance with these recommendations will ensure that countries
of the Region achieve and maintain the interruption of indigenous measles transmission
for as long as necessary until global eradication is achieved.
References:
(1) Pan American Health Organization. Elimination of measles in the Americas.
In: XXIV meeting of the Pan American Sanitary Conference (Washington, DC, 1995).
Washington, DC: PAHO, 1995.
(2) de Quadros CA, Olivé JM, Hersh BS, et al. Measles elimination in
the Americas - evolving strategies. JAMA 1996; 275:224-9.
(3) Hersh BS, Tambini G, Nogueira AC, Carrasco P, de Quadros CA. Review of regional
measles surveillance data in the Americas, 1996-1999. Lancet 2000; 355:1943-8.
(4) Black FL. Measles. In: Evans AS, ed. Viral infections of humans. Epidemiology
and control. 3rd ed. New York: Plenum Publishing, 1989:451-65.
(5) Hope-Simpson RE. Infectiousness of communicable diseases in the household.
Lancet 1952; 2:549-54.
(6) De Serres G, Gay NJ, Farrington CP. Epidemiology of transmissible diseases
after elimination. Am J Epidemiol 2000; 151:1039-48.
(7) Koening AM, Bishai D, Khan MA. Health Interventions and health equity: the
example of measles vaccination in Bangladesh. Popul Dev Rev 2001; 27:283-302.
(8) World Health Organization. Report of the Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health. Investment in global health will save 8 million lives a year and generate
at least a $360 billion annual gain within 15 years, says a new report presented
to WHO. Press release: 20 December 2001. Available at: http://www3.who.int/whosis/cmh/cmh_press/e/who_hq_20Dec2001.htm.
Accessed on 22 September 2003.
Source: Article published in Journal of Infectious Diseases,
Special Supplement on Global measles as: Izurieta H, Venczel L, Dietz V,et et
al. Monitoring Measles Eradication in the Region of the Americas: Critical Activities
and Tools. JID, Special Supplement on Global measles. 2003; 187(Suppl):187:S133-9
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Epidemiological Bulletin, Vol. 24 No. 3, September
2003




