



Overview International Health Regulations (IHR) and Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GO(A)RN)

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Regional Risk Communication Consultation
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International Health Regulations



- WHO Member States recognized need to collectively respond to public health emergencies of international concern (1994, 1995, 2003)
- An Intergovernmental Working Group tasked with the revision of the IHR(1969) in 2004
- WHO Member States adopted the current IHR during the 58th World Health Assembly in 2005
- Current IHR entered into force in June 2007
- A legal tool: describes procedures, rights and legal obligations for States Parties and WHO




International Health Regulations

- Legal framework requested, negotiated, and developed by WHO Member States
- Recognition of a collective responsibility towards international public health, based on dialogue, transparency and trust - nothing new at technical level (Annex 1 – existing)
- Tool that serves public health according to good, evidence-based, practice and adapted to the context
- Opportunity to establish / maintain a public health system robust enough to ensure the flexibility needed to institutionalise lessons learned from real life in a continuous and dynamic manner



Purpose and scope of the IHR

“to prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade” (Article 2)




- From three diseases to all public health hazards, irrespective of origin or source
- From preset measures to adapted response
- From control of borders to, also, containment at source




WHO strategic framework IHR Areas of Work, 2007

1. Foster global partnerships
2. Strengthen national disease prevention, surveillance, control and response systems
3. Strengthen public health security in travel and transport
4. Strengthen WHO global alert and response systems
5. Strengthen the management of specific risks
6. Sustain rights, obligations and procedures
7. Conduct studies and monitor progress






IHR operational framework



Annex 1 – National Core Capacity

AW2: Strengthen national disease prevention, surveillance, control and response systems

AW3: Strengthen public health security in travel and transport






Annex 1

Community/
primary level

1A
**Public Health
Surveillance
and Response**

Art. 5
Art. 13



Intermediate
level

National
level

Art. 19
Art. 20
Art. 21

1B
Points of Entry

At all times

Potential PHEIC




Art. 4

National IHR Focal Point (NFP)



MERCOSUR assessment and planning tools revision 2008

- I. Legal and administrative framework
- II. Risk detection, risk assessment, and reporting
- III. Control – investigation, intervention; and risk communication



| 3. CAPACIDAD PARA DETECTAR, EVALUAR Y RESPONDER | | | |
|---|-----------------|-----------|------------------------|
| 3.1. Recursos humanos y materiales | Completa SI, NO | Actividad | responsable cronograma |
| 3.1.1. Personal de salud de primer nivel | | | |
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| 3.1.9. Personal de salud de noveno nivel | | | |
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PLAN DE ACCIÓN 2008-2012 PARA ALCANZAR LAS CAPACIDADES BÁSICAS DE VIGILANCIA Y RESPUESTAS

| OBJETIVO GENERAL 1: ADAPTAR EL MARCO LEGAL, INSTITUCIONAL Y ADMINISTRATIVO AL NUEVO RSI (2005) | | | | | |
|---|--|--|--|----------|--------|
| Problema detectado | Actividad | responsable | cronograma | Recursos | Fuente |
| Objetivo específico N° 1: concientizar a los efectores de salud para dar cumplimiento al Código Sanitario sobre enfermedades de notificación obligatoria | | | | | |
| Falta de cumplimiento del Código Sanitario sobre enfermedades de notificación obligatoria | 1. reunión con diferentes actores de los subsistemas de salud pública, seguridad social y privado para concientización de la obligatoriedad de la notificación, 2. elaboración de notas recordatorias ante la falta de notificación de los efectores, 3. solicitud a la DGVS la finalización de la actualización del código de salud. | 1 y 3. Dirección RSXVIII, 2. vigilancia. | 1. marzo 2009, 2. continuo, 3. diciembre 2009 | | |
| Falta de un programa regular de sensibilización a los efectores de salud | 1. programación de talleres de sensibilización periódicos para los efectores de salud sobre la vigilancia cada dos años con actualizaciones sobre normativas de vigilancia, 2. Realización de los talleres. | 1. dirección, 2. vigilancia | 1. febrero 2009, 2. julio 2009 y cada dos años | | |
| Objetivo específico N° 2: adaptar las normas y procedimientos de vigilancia y respuesta al nuevo RSI (2005) | | | | | |
| En el Código no consta quiénes deben notificar | 1. solicitud a DGVS la modificación del código en el código sobre la obligatoriedad de notificar especificando los actores que deben notificar, 2. capacitación y concientización a los efectores sobre el cambio. | 1. Dirección, 2. DGVS | 1 y 2. marzo 2009. | | |
| Normas de procedimientos de vigilancia y respuesta sin actualizar | 1. solicitud del manual nacional de vigilancia donde consten todos los eventos y los componentes de vigilancia, investigación con sus fichas correspondientes y las medidas de prevención y control ambiental y de enfermos y expuestos, 2. solicitud de culminación de la revisión del manual, 3. adaptación del manual. | 1 y 2. vigilancia, 3. DGVS | 1 y 2. diciembre 2008, 3. marzo 2010 | | |
| No se cuenta con todos los formatos de notificación | 1. solicitud a DGVS la actualización de las fichas de las ENO, 2. actualización de las fichas, 3. socializar las fichas entre los efectores de salud y los futuros referentes de vigilancia de los establecimientos. | 1 y 3. Dirección, 2. DGVS | 1 y 2. diciembre 2008, 3. marzo 2010 | | |
| Objetivo específico N° 3: fortalecer el sistema con presupuesto propio | | | | | |
| Falta de presupuesto anual para vigilancia | 1. solicitud a DGVS para que gestione la incorporación de las actividades de vigilancia dentro de los formatos de POA regionales, 2. solicitud al director para participar de la elaboración del POA 2010, 3. incorporación de las actividades de vigilancia dentro del POA regional para 2010, 4. asignación el presupuesto para 2010, 5. solicitud de reprogramación del POA 2009. | 1. director, 2 y 5. vigilancia, 3 y 4. administración. | 1, 2. y 5. diciembre 2008, 3. julio 2009, 4. a partir de enero 2010. | | |

III. Control – investigation, intervention; and risk communication

III.A HUMAN RESOURCES AND TRAINING

Are there interdisciplinary Rapid Response Teams (RRT) for public health emergencies?

If yes, is the following expertise represented: [...], **mass communications** (*comunicación social*)?

III.D COORDINATION OF RESPONSE

Is there a national government committee for responding to health emergencies?

Does this committee consider coordination with other national institutions and areas to be strategic to the implementation of control measures? If so, is there coordination with: [...], **education, mass communication**, [...]

Is there a national health sector committee for health emergency response?

Does this committee consider coordination with other health sector teams that are involved in response?



If so, is there coordination with: [...], **health promotion, information and communication**?

III. Control – investigation, intervention; and risk communication

III.G MASS COMMUNICATION

- In public health emergencies, are official Ministry of Health reports or press releases regularly used for conveying information to the public?
- In public health emergencies, are epidemiological alerts for health professionals regularly used?
- In public health emergencies, is a Web page available to disseminate information?
- Is there a national crisis communication plan?
 - If yes, does the plan identify: communication partners, spokespeople, uniform design for common messages, channels, procedures for mobilizing and informing spokespeople to conduct press conferences and produce news articles, tools (alerts, bulletins, profiles, etc., uniform design for the emergency Web page?
- Is there a procedures manual for the preparation of local crisis communication plans?
 - If yes, does the manual contain the procedures mentioned in SEE ABOVE
- During an emergency, does the national communication system enable: timely communication of news, being first in providing regular updates, immediately preparing notices from technical reports, designing clear messages according to the audience (persons affected by the emergency, health workers, children, etc.), immediately preparing the Web page on the emergency, updating the Web page daily, immediately preparing and calling press conferences, requesting interviews with the media?

WHO global tool for monitoring core capacities v. 2011

1. National legislation, policy and financing
 2. Coordination and NFP communications
 3. Surveillance
 4. Response
 5. Preparedness
 6. **Risk communication**
 7. Human resource capacity
 8. Laboratory
-
- Points of Entry
 - IHR Potential hazards 1: zoonotic events
 - IHR Potential hazards 2: food safety
 - IHR Potential hazards 3: chemical event
 - IHR Potential hazards 4: radiation emergencies



| | | |
|----------------------|--------------|---|
| Core Capacity | 2 | Coordination⁸ and NFP Communications |
| Component | 2.1 | IHR coordination⁹, communication and advocacy¹⁰ |
| Indicator | 2.1.1 | *A mechanism is established for the coordination of relevant sectors¹¹ in the implementation of IHR |

2.1.1.1 Is there coordination within relevant ministries on events that may constitute a public health event or risk of national or international concern?

2.1.1.2 Are Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) or equivalent available for coordination between IHR NFP and relevant sectors?

2.1.1.3 Is a multi-sectoral, multidisciplinary body, committee or taskforce in place addressing IHR requirements on surveillance and response for public health emergencies of national and international concern?

2.1.1.4 Have multisectoral and multidisciplinary coordination and communication mechanisms been tested and updated regularly through exercises or through the occurrence of an actual event?

2.1.1.5 Are annual updates conducted on status of IHR implementation to stakeholders across all relevant sectors?



| | | |
|----------------------|--------------|---|
| Core Capacity | 2 | Coordination⁸ and NFP Communications |
| Component | 2.1 | IHR coordination, communication and advocacy |
| Indicator | 2.1.2 | *IHR NFP functions and operations in place as defined by IHR |

2.1.2.1 Has the IHR NFP been established?

2.1.2.2 Have national stakeholders responsible for the implementation of IHR been identified?

2.1.2.3 Has information on obligations of the IHR NFP under the IHR been disseminated to relevant national authorities and stakeholders?

2.1.2.4 Have the roles and responsibilities of relevant authorities and stakeholders in regard to IHR implementation been defined and disseminated?

2.1.2.5 Have plans to sensitize stakeholders of their roles and responsibilities been implemented?

2.1.2.6 Is the IHR Event Information Site used as an integral part of the IHR NFP information resource?

2.1.2.7 Has an active IHR website or webpage been established?

2.1.2.8 Have any additional roles and responsibilities for the IHR NFP functions been implemented?

2.1.2.9 Does the IHR NFP provide WHO with updated contact information as well as annual confirmation of the IHR NFP?

| | | |
|----------------------|--------------|--|
| Core Capacity | 6 | Risk Communication |
| Component | 6.1 | Policy and procedures for public communications |
| Indicator | 6.1.1 | *Mechanisms for effective risk communication during a public health emergency are established |


- 6.1.1.1 Have risk communication partners and stakeholders been identified?
- 6.1.1.2 Has a risk communication plan been developed?
- 6.1.1.3 Has the risk communication plan been implemented or tested through actual emergency or simulation exercise and updated in the last 12 months?
- 6.1.1.4 Are policies, SOPs or guidelines developed on the clearance and release of information during a public health emergency?
- 6.1.1.5 Are regularly updated information sources accessible to media and the public for information dissemination?
- 6.1.1.6 Are there accessible and relevant IEC (Information, Education and Communications) materials tailored to the needs of the population?
- 6.1.1.7 In the last three national or international PH emergencies, have populations and partners been informed of a real or potential risk within 24 hours following confirmation?
- 6.1.1.8 Has an evaluation of the public health communication been conducted after emergencies, for timeliness, transparency and appropriateness of communications, been carried out?
- 6.1.1.9 Have results of evaluations of risk communications efforts during a public health emergency been shared with the global community?



SUMMARY REPORT

Meeting of the IHR Risk Communication and Capacity Building Working Group
WHO Lyon Office for National Epidemic Preparedness and Response
16-18 March 2011, Lyon, France





Annual Report to the WHA on the Implementation of the IHR (Art.54, WHA61.2)

Procedural and technical options



Review of the Functioning of the Regulations (Art.54, DG proposal at 126th EB)

Report of the IHR Review Committee (A64.10)



Implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005)

Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009

National IHR Action Plan (/ individual Action Plans for designated Points of Entry)

Procedural and technical options



Decision making process to request the extension of the 2012 deadline to 2014

Procedural and technical options

MERCOSUR tool



| Country | Sub-region | MERCOSUR tool | Date assessment | National IHR Action Plan | National IHR Action Plan budgeted |
|--------------------|------------|---------------|-----------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Bolivia | ANDEAN | si | Nov-09 | si | no |
| Chile | ANDEAN | si | 2009 | si | in progress |
| Colombia | ANDEAN | si* | UNK | si* | ? |
| Ecuador | ANDEAN | si | Dec-08 | si | si |
| Peru | ANDEAN | si | Jun-10 | si | in progress |
| Venezuela | ANDEAN | si* | UNK | si* | ? |
| Argentina | MERCOSUR | si | Jul-08 | si | in progress |
| Brazil | MERCOSUR | si | 2009 | si | in progress |
| Paraguay | MERCOSUR | si | Nov-08 | si | si |
| Uruguay | MERCOSUR | si | 2008 | si | si |
| Costa Rica | RESSCAD | si | | si - costos? | ? |
| Dominican Republic | RESSCAD | si | | si - costos? | ? |
| El Salvador | RESSCAD | si | | si | si |
| Guatemala | RESSCAD | si | | si | si |
| Honduras | RESSCAD | si | | no | si |
| Nicaragua | RESSCAD | si | | si | si |
| Panama | RESSCAD | si | | si | si |



CAREC tool



Assessment of the needs of European Overseas Territories

A report commissioned by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and prepared by the Health Protection Agency (United Kingdom) in collaboration with Institut de Veille Sanitaire (France), the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (Netherlands), and the Greenland Medical Office of Health

October 2009



| Country | Assessment | CAREC tool |
|-------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Antigua and Barbuda | yes | yes |
| Belize | yes | no |
| Guyana | yes | no |
| Jamaica | yes | yes |
| Surinam | yes | no |
| Bahamas | yes | no |
| Barbados | yes | yes |
| Dominica | yes | yes |
| Grenada | yes | yes |
| Saint Lucia | yes | yes |
| St Kitts and Nevis | yes | yes |
| St Vincent and the Grenadines | yes | yes |
| Trinidad and Tobago | yes | yes |



States Parties reports on IHR implementation Feb – Oct 2010


Globally: 63% (123/194; 120/123 SP used WHO/HQ format)

- AFRO 50%
- **AMRO 54%** (1 SP using MERCOSUR tool)
89% en 2008 y 66% en 2009
- EMRO 82%
- EURO 60% (2 SP using other format)
- SEARO 100% (1 SP other format)
- WPRO 74%



Core capacity

Regional Average Attribute Scores



The scores, ranging from 0 to 100%, are automatically calculated using data analysis software embedded in the internet-based tool. For the sake of simplicity, all attributes are given the same weight. In calculating the attribute score, the numerator is the total number of attributes achieved in levels 1 and 2 combined, and the denominator is the sum of Level 1 and 2 attributes.

IHR Review Committee

Functioning of the International Health Regulations (2005) in relation to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009

Summary Conclusions

1. The IHR helped make the world better prepared to cope with public-health emergencies...but core capacities are not yet fully operational and not on a path to timely implementation worldwide
2. WHO performed well in many ways during the pandemic, confronted systemic difficulties and demonstrated some shortcomings. The Committee found no evidence of malfeasance
3. The world is ill-prepared to respond to a severe influenza pandemic or to any similarly global, sustained and threatening public-health emergency



Summary conclusion 2

WHO performed well in many ways but systemic difficulties and shortcomings...no evidence of malfeasance

- R5: Strengthen WHO's internal capacity for sustained response
- R6: Improve practices for appointment of an Emergency Committee
- R7: Revise pandemic preparedness guidance
- R8: Develop and apply measures to assess severity
- **R9: Streamline management of guidance documents**
- **R10: Develop and implement a strategic, organization-wide communications policy**
- R11: Encourage advance agreements for vaccine distribution and delivery



"Elusive transparency....."



AW4: Strengthen WHO global alert and response systems




WHO global alert and response systems

- Decentralized Structure & Capacity
 - 6 regional and 142 country offices
- Collective experience in managing public health events
 - Consistency
 - Timeliness
 - Technical Excellence
 - Transparency and Accountability
- Networks and Partnerships (e.g. GOARN, regional and sub-regional networks, specialist networks, WHO CCs; GISN)





IHR operational framework



Decision instrument (Annex 2)


Notifiable diseases:

- Poliomyelitis, wild-type virus
- Human influenza, new subtype
- SARS
- Smallpox

Any event of potential international public health concern

Diseases that shall always lead to utilization of the algorithm:


Cholera, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, viral haemorrhagic fevers (Ebola, Lassa, Marburg), West Nile fever, other diseases of special national or regional concern (e.g. dengue fever, Rift Valley fever and meningococcal disease)



Decision instrument (Annex 2)

Two of the following criteria...but

- Is the public health impact of the event serious?
- Is the event unusual or unexpected?
- Is there a significant risk of international spread?
- Is there a significant risk of international travel or trade restrictions?




- Not a risk assessment framework per se
- Guidance to inform the decision to communicate with WHO
- When in doubt
- Potential benefits
- Anything that you would want to know from others



WHO Event Management Process

Information and Public Health Response



Early warning function of the public health surveillance system

100% coverage, 100% sensitivity, 100% flexibility



Indicator-based surveillance (discrete variables)

- Case based (aggregated, individual)
- Laboratory results
- Environmental measurements
- Drug sales
- Absenteeism
- Etc.

| Core Capacity | 3 | Surveillance ^a |
|---------------|-------|---|
| Component | 1.1 | Indicator-based surveillance ^a (see footnote 1) to detect outbreaks, syndromes or anomalies in defined conditions |
| Indicator | 2.1.1 | Indicator-based surveillance includes an early warning ^b function for the early detection of a public health event |

Event-based surveillance (unstructured information)

- Media reports
- Hotlines (community, professionals, etc.)
- NGOs
- Diplomatic channels
- Military channels
- Etc.

| Core Capacity | 3 | Surveillance ^a |
|---------------|-------|---|
| Component | 1.2 | Event-based surveillance ^a |
| Indicator | 2.2.1 | Event-based surveillance is established |

Signal

Unusual health event

Triangulation
des sources

Verification



Response

| Core Capacity | 4 | Response |
|---------------|-------|--|
| Component | 4.1 | Rapid Response Capacity |
| Indicator | 2.1.1 | Public health emergency ^b response mechanisms are established |



EMS beta World Health Organization

Welcome, Gerard DUMAS | [Help](#) | [Logout](#)

[Regions](#) | [Events](#) | [Diseases/Conditions](#) | [Contacts](#) | [Admin](#)

Event Summary

2009-E000027 - Liberia

Yellow Fever Current as of 2009-04-05

Current - Substantiated - To be assigned


Summary General Information


| | | |
|---|--|--|
| Event ID: 2009-E000027 Country / Area: Liberia Region: AFRO Date Created: 2009-04-04 Date Information First Received: 2009-04-21 | Hazard: Infectious Syndromes: n/a Disease / Condition: Yellow fever Aetiology: n/a Estimated Date of Onset: n/a | Event Status: Current Admin Office: WHO Headquarters Office Contact Admin Designation: Substantiated Designation Date: 2009-04-22 Time To Designation: 1 day |
|---|--|--|

Presentation


Event Presentation as of Date: 2009-04-04
 No details provided.

Assessment and Verification

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Laboratory Confirmed: No Date Of Test: n/a Confirmed by: n/a WHO Assessment: Serious Public Health impact | Verification Status: WHO-APP n/a assessment ongoing Verification Status Date: 2009-04-21 WHO Assessment: To be assigned State Party Assessment: Not provided | Map  |
|---|---|---|



Substantiated acute public health events, by country (EMS, 1 January 2001 – 9 June 2010, n=1,945) *



The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.



Data Source: World Health Organization
 Map Production: Public Health Information
 and Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
 World Health Organization



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Information for WHO National Focal Points - Windows Internet Explorer

File Edit View Favorites Tools Help

WHO Event Information for WHO National Focal Points

Event Information Site for WHO National Focal Points

Current Events: Germany / Hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS)

Risk Assessment: Serious Public Health Impact, Unusual or unexpected, International disease spread, Interference with international travel or trade

Date Information First Received by WHO: 2011-05-22

HUS Status: Public Health Risk (PHR), Laboratory Confirmed, WHO HUS Contact Point

Organización Panamericana de la Salud, Organización Mundial de la Salud

HAGA UNA DONACIÓN Ayuda a las víctimas del terremoto en Haití

Alertas Epidemiológicas

Alerta epidemiológica: Brotes de dengue en las Américas (8 de marzo de 2010)

Hasta la fecha de elaboración del informe, los países de la Región notifican un total de 146.000 casos de dengue, de los cuales 2.708 son dengue grave. Se reportan 79 fallecidos con una tasa de letalidad Regional del 2,9%. Este informe incluye secciones con datos y/o mapas sobre Argentina, Brasil, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay y Puerto Rico, así como indicaciones sobre la gravedad, los serotipos en circulación, las áreas afectadas y las acciones tomadas. El informe también incluye las recomendaciones oficiales para la prevención y el control del dengue.

Alerta epidemiológica: Brotes de dengue en las Américas (8 de marzo de 2010)

Monitoreo de la Pandemia: Mapas Interactivos de Indicadores Cualitativos

GOARN


Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network

Current Events


World Health Organization 100 Events (27 March 2011)

Mapa interactivo de casos de la Pandemia (H1N1) 2009

| Event Name | Country | Status | Date of Onset |
|---------------------------------|---------|-----------|---------------|
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |
| H1N1 (2009) - Mexico/California | Mexico | Confirmed | 15/04/2009 |



Field operations framework





Field operations framework



Community Discussion



ional

Medical

Anthropology

Screeni
IN / OU



Water



Mobile Teams

roads

police



salaries

Transports
Vehicles



Psycho
Social
support



Reporting
Results

Sample
Collection
Testing

THE INCORPORATED
LIVERPOOL SCHOOL OF TROPICAL MEDICINE
UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL

[illegible]


The Council of the School are considering creating a disaster team, the members of which would be available on call to go to any disaster area where their special knowledge and abilities might be useful.

I am writing to ask you whether you think there is any
 need for such an arrangement and whether you would feel that it would be
 useful to the W.H.O., to be given details of it in due course, and to have
 such a group to call on if need be.

Best wishes,

- No single institution has all the capacity!
- Coordinate and supported rapid international team support to countries for outbreak response
- To focus and coordinate global resources - local > regional > global






- Global technical partnership, coordinated by WHO
- Members: Technical institutions capable of providing international assistance
- Assist countries with disease control efforts by ensuring rapid appropriate multi-disciplinary technical support to affected populations
- Investigate and characterize events and assess risks of rapidly emerging epidemic disease threats
- Support national outbreak preparedness by ensuring that responses contribute to sustained containment of epidemic threats
- With the Code of Conductseek to promote the highest standards of professional performance in the field


Building the Network

GOARN
2000 - 2010

- Access to resources, information exchange and sharing of best practice, technology transfer (*Alert for early warning and response coordination and planning; Request for Assistance; Operational updates from the field; Weekly Newsletter and Sharepoint site*)
- Reduce vulnerability and strengthen resilience, provide redundancy
- Alleviate costs, by improving the use/mobilization of resources, and providing surge capacity
- Steering Committee
- Guiding Principles and SOPs
- Protocols for operational communications and website
- Support systems for field response, including field logistics capacity
- Training Outbreak Response Leaders and Teams
-  Field Tools – FIMS
- Evaluation

WHO/GOARN Outbreak Response Operations, 2000–2010

- Acute Haemorrhagic Fever Syndrome
- Acute Hepatitis E.
- Acute Neurological Syndrome
- Avian influenza
- Cholera
- Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever
- Dengue Fever
- Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever (EHF)
- Hysteria
- Infectious
- Influenza
- Lassa Fever
- Leptospirosis
- Marburg Haemorrhagic Fever
- Meningococcal Disease
- Monkeypox
- Myocarditis
- Nipah Viral Disease
- Olympics
- Pandemic influenza
- Plague
- Pyrrolizidine alkaloids
- Rift Valley Fever
- Sandfly fever
- Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
- Suspected Dengue Haemorrhagic Fever
- Toxic
- Tsunami
- Viral Haemorrhagic Fever
- Whooping cough
- Yellow Fever




The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the World Health Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Dotted lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.

Data Source: World Health Organization
Map Production: Public Health Information and Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
World Health Organization

 **World Health Organization**
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2009 - 2011



Build the Puzzle

Mexico Response

Regional Response

- Gathering intelligence
- Risk Assessment
- IHR channel
- Trilateral agreement
- Few people involved

- Complex
- Multiple external players: PAHO, WHO, CDC, PHAC, GOARN, Bilateral, Trilateral,.....
- Difficult access to key domestic players,
- 2 approaches:
 - support MOH and Gouvernement response,
 - gather / analyze information, field investigations

- Monitor the spread of the disease
- Direct technical assistance to prioritized countries and countries with epidemics
- Readiness assessment teams versus Rapid Response Teams;
- Two rounds in central America May-June / October-December.


April 10th – April 23rd

April 23rd – Mid May

Mid May – December



- 80 GOARN experts deployed to 18 AMRO countries from 24 Apr - 19 Dec
- 15 GOARN partners providing experts (12 from AMRO, 3 from EURO)
- Participation of GOARN partners ranges from 33 experts to 1 expert
- Some experts were deployed to 10 different countries between 5 May – 19 Dec
- Duration of mission in a specific country from 5 days to 3 months




Cholera

Haiti, 2010-to date



- Complex emergency
- Over 70 experts mobilised, Nov 2010-Mar 2011
- Early warning and response system at national and departmental level



New context



- Lessons were learnt
- Greater/Formal Regionalization of "Operations"
 - WHO Global Team, and Global Event Management System
 - Strategic Health Operations Centre and Regional Operations Hubs at Regional Offices, and in priority country offices



Ultimate network
National IHR Focal Points

Needs

- Equitable and appropriate participation in field missions
- Early Alert and Request for Assistance
- Clear Terms of Reference for International Missions
- Clear Terms of Reference for Experts
- Rapid, transparent, consistent decision-making
- Professional administration and contracting
- Dependable field logistics and consistent operational support
- Geographical, linguistic and cultural proximity



Regional Risk Communication Consultation

Agenda

Dates: → → 8-9 June 2011
Location: → → Tryp Montevideo Hotel
2361 Héctor Miranda
Montevideo, Uruguay

Wednesday, 8 June

→ → →
09:00—09:15 → Introduction and Welcome
Director General Gilberto Ríos
PAHO/WHO Representative Eduardo Levkovitz →
→ → → →
09:15—9:45 → Expected consultation outcomes → → → → Bryna Brennan →



**Organización
Panamericana
de la Salud**



Oficina Regional de la
Organización Mundial de la Salud

Reunión Regional de la Red de Alerta y Respuesta ante Brotes

Brasília, Brasil
14-16 Junio 2011



I. → OBJETIVO

Proporcionar una oportunidad para el intercambio de información e ideas entre los socios de la Red GOARN y la OPS/OMS y contribuir a fortalecer la articulación y consolidación de un Red Regional.

Thank you

Roberta Andraghetti

Tel: +1 202 974 3129

E-mail: andragro@paho.org

