

The background features a network diagram composed of silhouettes of people in various poses, connected by thin lines. The silhouettes are arranged in a roughly circular pattern, with some individuals highlighted in a reddish-brown color. The overall theme is social interaction and contact tracing.

# Backward contact tracing

Deep dive 26 May 2021


Claire Blackmore, WHO  
Klaas Nelissen, Leuven University  
Emilie Peron, WHO  
Joren Raymenants, Leuven University

# Examples of superspreading events and overdispersion

- February 2020, Daegu, South Korea: in a church mass gathering event, one case infected more than 5,000 known cases
- February 2020, Boston, United States: in a conference, one positive case led to at least 97 cases and eventually, the virus spread from the meeting across Massachusetts and to other states
- March 2020, Jordan: during a wedding, one infected attendee infected at least 76 cases of about 360 guests
- December 2020, Antwerp, Belgium: in a long-term care facility, one visitor infected 40 staff members and more than 100 residents. The visitor subsequently tested positive.
- Modelling studies
  - 19% of cases seeded 80% of all local transmission (Adam and al)
  - 10% of cases caused 80% of secondary transmissions (Endo and al; Sneppen and al)
  - 5% of infected individuals accounting for 80% of subsequent cases (Laxminarayan and al)

**High individual-level variation in the number of secondary transmissions**

**-> overdispersion ( $k \sim 0.1$ )**




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
# Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection

(A) Forward contact tracing only




# Consequences for contact tracing: Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection

## (A) Forward contact tracing only



# Consequences for contact tracing: Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection


## (A) Forward contact tracing only



# Consequences for contact tracing: Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection

(A) Forward contact tracing only

(B) Forward + backward contact tracing



# Consequences for contact tracing: Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection

(A) Forward contact tracing only

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




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(A) Forward contact tracing only

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# Pending questions and limitations

Effectiveness of the backward contact tracing activities depends on:

- Timeliness of the processes
- The local capacities (contact tracers and testing)
- > When to turn it on and off?
- > How to prioritize?
- > Can we be assisted by digital tools to identify the geolocation of infections?

Over dispersion and superspreading events depend on:

- Environment: closed, crowded, closed contact, PHMS in place and adherence, activities practiced, types of contact (close, regular, random)
- People (age, immunity)??
- Virus (variants)??
- Time??

# Bibliography and useful links

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