

The background features a network diagram composed of silhouettes of people in various poses, connected by thin lines. The silhouettes are arranged in a roughly circular pattern, with a central figure from which lines radiate outwards to other figures, representing a contact network. The silhouettes are in shades of gray and red.

Backward contact tracing

Deep dive 26 May 2021


Claire Blackmore, WHO
Klaas Nelissen, Leuven University
Emilie Peron, WHO
Joren Raymenants, Leuven University

Examples of superspreading events and overdispersion

- February 2020, Daegu, South Korea: in a church mass gathering event, one case infected more than 5,000 known cases
- February 2020, Boston, United States: in a conference, one positive case led to at least 97 cases and eventually, the virus spread from the meeting across Massachusetts and to other states
- March 2020, Jordan: during a wedding, one infected attendee infected at least 76 cases of about 360 guests
- December 2020, Antwerp, Belgium: in a long-term care facility, one visitor infected 40 staff members and more than 100 residents. The visitor subsequently tested positive.
- Modelling studies
 - 19% of cases seeded 80% of all local transmission (Adam and al)
 - 10% of cases caused 80% of secondary transmissions (Endo and al; Sneppen and al)
 - 5% of infected individuals accounting for 80% of subsequent cases (Laxminarayan and al)

High individual-level variation in the number of secondary transmissions

-> overdispersion ($k \sim 0.1$)




Examples of superspreading events and overdispersion

- February 2020, Daegu, South Korea: in a church mass gathering event, one case infected more than 5,000 known cases
- February 2020, Boston, United States: in a conference, one positive case led to at least 97 cases and eventually, the virus spread from the meeting across Massachusetts and to other states
- March 2020, Jordan: during a wedding, one infected attendee infected at least 76 cases of about 360 guests
- December 2020, Antwerp, Belgium: in a long-term care facility, one visitor infected 40 staff members and more than 100 residents. The visitor subsequently tested positive.
- Modelling studies
 - 19% of cases seeded 80% of all local transmission (Adam and al)
 - 10% of cases caused 80% of secondary transmissions (Endo and al; Sneppen and al)
 - 5% of infected individuals accounting for 80% of subsequent cases (Laxminarayan and al)

High individual-level variation in the number of secondary transmissions

-> overdispersion ($k \sim 0.1$)




Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection

(A) Forward contact tracing only




Consequences for contact tracing: Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection

(A) Forward contact tracing only



Consequences for contact tracing: Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection


(A) Forward contact tracing only



Consequences for contact tracing: Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection

(A) Forward contact tracing only

(B) Forward + backward contact tracing



Consequences for contact tracing: Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection

(A) Forward contact tracing only


(B) Forward + backward contact tracing



Consequences for contact tracing: Likelihood of infection from a superspreading event > likelihood of further infection

(A) Forward contact tracing only

(B) Forward + backward contact tracing



Pending questions and limitations

Effectiveness of the backward contact tracing activities depends on:

- Timeliness of the processes
- The local capacities (contact tracers and testing)
- > When to turn it on and off?
- > How to prioritize?
- > Can we be assisted by digital tools to identify the geolocation of infections?

Over dispersion and superspreading events depend on:

- Environment: closed, crowded, closed contact, PHMS in place and adherence, activities practiced, types of contact (close, regular, random)
- People (age, immunity)??
- Virus (variants)??
- Time??

Bibliography and useful links

- <https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/09/k-overlooked-variable-driving-pandemic/616548/>
- <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00460-x>
- <https://vis.sciencemag.org/covid-clusters/>
- Lemieux and al, Phylogenetic analysis of SARS-CoV-2 in the Boston area highlights the role of recurrent importation and superspreading events. MedRxiv, August 2020. <https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2020.08.23.20178236v1>
- Yousef and al, Large Outbreak of Coronavirus Disease among Wedding Attendees, Jordan. Emerging infectious diseases, September 2020. https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/26/9/20-1469_article
- Adam and al, Clustering and superspreading potential of SARS-CoV-2 infections in Hong Kong. Nature Medecine, September 2020. <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-020-1092-0>
- Majra and al, SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) superspreader events, Journal of infection, November 2020. [https://www.journalofinfection.com/article/S0163-4453\(20\)30717-9/fulltext](https://www.journalofinfection.com/article/S0163-4453(20)30717-9/fulltext)
- Endo and al, Estimating the overdispersion in COVID-19 transmission using outbreak sizes outside China. Wellcome Open Research, July 2020. <https://wellcomeopenresearch.org/articles/5-67>
- Sneppen and al, Overdispersion in COVID-19 increases the effectiveness of limiting nonrepetitive contacts for transmission control. PNAS, March 2021. <https://www.pnas.org/content/118/14/e2016623118>
- Laxminarayan and al, Epidemiology and transmission dynamics of COVID-19 in two Indian states, Science, November 2020. <https://science.sciencemag.org/content/370/6517/691>